Introduction
Medicine and Law serve the community best when they walk in step. If they proceed at different speeds, trouble is apt to arise. Unfortunately, law is often a laggard, and at times medicine gains the lead by long and rapid strides. Doctors are then startled to learn that their projects may land them in Court for breaking what they condemn as myopic and arthritic laws. The reason is not far to seek. 'Law', it has been said, 'does not search out as do science and medicine; it reacts to social needs and demands.... The problem must arise . . . before the law reacts to provide a solution. Here is where science and law differ' [1] .
The transplantation of organs affords a prime illustration. Consider the remarkable record. It was but fifteen years ago that the first successful kidney transplant was performed between identical twins and ten years ago that the first of such transplants took place between non-twins. It was on December 3, 1967 , that the world's first heart transplant took place in South Africa. Last year in Cambridge the liver of a 4-year-old boy was transplanted to a woman of 44. Last February the first transplant of a larynx was successfully carried out in Belgium. And in March the second lung transplant in Britain (and the seventh in the world) was carried out on a man in his 50s.
Doctors are by no means the only people who have been stirred by these achievements. On the contrary, organ transplantation is a subject about which the community rightly feels deeply. The public fascination is similar to the wide interest shown when the eighteenth century anatomists dismembered bodies in search of the seat of the soul and believed they had located it in the pineal gland. An American Law Journal recently told of a 'sick-humour' cartoon depicting a sleeping hospital patient partly covered by a large sign which warned: 'Patient asleep -NOT a heart donor'; of the car-sticker reading, 'Drive carefully -Di. Barnard may be watching'; and of the Gallup Poll revelation that seven Americans out of ten are willing to donate vital organs at their deaths [2] . And the BBC almost nonchalantly announced last February that a deceased's family had consented to the removal of his heart, liver, kidneys and both eyes for transplant purposes. Some would castigate this as consenting to virtual cannibalization. But lawyers, whatever their attitude towards the ethical problems created by transplants, are also concerned about their legality. The considerations involved fall naturally into two groups, depending upon whether the transplant is from a living donor or from a cadaver.
Living Doniors I believe that in France the law still is that organ transplants from living donors are illegal. Under English law we begin with the proposition that no man may lawfully consent to his body being maimed. Accordingly, in 1604, a 'young, strong and lustie rogue, to make himselfe impotent', had his left hand cut off by another so that he might make his living as a beggar, and both men were convicted of a criminal offence [3] . In 1934 it was decided that the consent of the girl involved afforded a man no defence to charges of indecent and common assault by blows intended to cause her bodily harm delivered to gratify his perversion [4] . And where a man had himself sterilized to spite his wife, Lord Denning said in 1954 that the operation was plainly illegal even though performed at his request, since it was without just cause or excuse [5] .
English law has hitherto recognized only two cases where consent affords a defence to a charge of unlawfully causing bodily harm: (a) blows given in the course of friendly athletic contests; and (b) blows given in the course of rough, but innocent horseplay [6] . As far as a transplant donee is concerned, the position seems straightforward, for as the operation is designed for his benefit it is difficult to see how he could possibly be said to be 'maimed' as a result. Nevertheless, if he is of full age and in fit condition to give his written consent, it would be wise to obtain it. As to children, I respectfully adopt the view expressed by the Medical Research Council in 1964 that it is clearly within the competence of the parents or guardian of a child to give permission for procedure intended to benefit that child....' But what of the living donor? In the surgical sense, his anatomy is undoubtedly 'maimed' if a healthy organ is removed. Does what lawyers would regard as a prima-facie case of 'maiming' cease to be one if its object is to transplant the removed organ in another who might otherwise die? English law gives no clear answer to the question. But Lord Kilbrandon regards the 'maiming' doctrine as 'intended to strike at actions which are socially wrong, or at least inexpedient, such as brutal sports, the gratification of lust, or the evasion of public duties' [7] .
For my part (and, of course, I here speak entirely extra-judicially) I should be surprised if a surgeon were successfully sued for trespass to the person or convicted of causing bodily harm to one of full age and intelligence who freely consented to act as donoralways provided that the operation did not present unreasonable risk to that donor's life or health. That proviso is essential. A man may declare himself ready to die for another, but the surgeon must not take him at his word. As Lord Devlin has said, 'The Good Samaritan is a character unesteemed in English law' [8] . So the surgeon must act delicately, since few transplant operations are entirely without some risk to the donor. Thus, although I can survive even though I sacrifice a kidney, I have been depleted of my reserve and would be in a sad plight were my remaining kidney to give trouble. It is true that (certainly in America) I can still have my life insured at standard rates if I am otherwise healthy, so low do insurance companies rate the risk that I may lose my remaining kidney through disease or injury. But the position is by no means the same for all transplants, and consent (no matter how clearly given) confers no absolution on the surgeon who foresees that the operation may seriously endanger the donor's health. Furthermore, as Professor Daube has said, '. . . the plight of the prospective recipient must emerge as heavily outweighing the danger and loss to be incurred by the donor' [9] . So again the surgeon must not operate if, on balance, the risk involved to the donor cannot reasonably be regarded as justified in the public interest by the good likely to enure to the donee.
While that problem must remain inescapable, the surgeon has quite enough on his hands without having to consider the legality of his procedure. It is admittedly unlikely that the existing law keeps many transplant teams awake at night. Nevertheless, at present they are undoubtedly exposed to an irritant and at theoretical risk of forensic indignity to which they ought not to be subjected. I would therefore advocate legislation making it clear that an operation for transplant purposes will not per se give rise to either civil or criminal liability, while still leaving unaffected the surgeon's duty of proper care in deciding whether the risk involved to the donor is so great as to render the operation inadvisable. That degree of protection the surgeon and his team may properly ask for, and it should be speedily provided.
But all this is, of course, contingent upon the consent of the donor being both free and informed. How can this be ensured? Professor Hamburger of the Paris Faculty of Medicine has laid down certain conditions which the lawyer, as well as the scientist, would do well to consider carefully. Here they are: (a) The donor must be made fully aware of the exact dangers he is running. (b) He must have a reasonable motive for wishing to donate part of his body. The Professor adds: 'At Paris . . . we have adopted the habit of considering a volunteer acceptable if he is a relative of the patient to be saved, and unacceptable if he is not'. (c) Adequate steps must be taken to verify whether there has been pressure from the family or elsewhere.
(d) There should be a psychological (if not a psychiatric) examination to verify that the volunteer is in full possession of his mental faculties. The Professor concludes: 'This psychological examination seems to us to be mandatory' [10] .
By such salutary safeguards French surgeons hope to keep out of the Law Courts, even though they break their legal prohibition against operating save for the benefit of the specific patient.
So far, we have assumed that the living donor is of mature years and sensibility. If mentally debilitated, his consent is worthless. Then should prisoners be permitted to act as donors? It seems wrong to deny them this opportunity to manifest an enduring sense of responsibility towards the community from which they are physically set apart, and for some time penal volunteers were accepted in Colorado hospitals. But prisoners are subject to influences inimical to complete freedom of choice, and the risk of their undertaking the role of donor without bringing a balanced judgment to bear on the matter is so great that their acceptance was discontinued in Colorado early in 1966. There are arguments both ways, but, all things considered, that may be regarded as a wise decision.
The consent of a minor to act as donor ought not to be accepted. Nor can a parent or guardian lawfully consent to his child so acting. I venture to express that view notwithstanding that in 1956 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court declared it lawful to transplant a kidney from a healthy boy of 14 to his identical twin dying from renal disease. Accepting the psychiatric evidence that, if the operation were not performed and the sick twin died, there would be 'a grave emotional impact' on the survivor, the Court held the transplant necessary for the continued good health of the donor and that the operation would accordingly benefit both him and the donee. But no surgeon should assume that the issue would necessarily be decided in the same way under English law.
I trust that the comity of nations will not be seriously undermined if I express a similar view about another American case [11] , where a 15-year-old boy consented at his aunt's request to act as donor in a skin graft for the benefit of his cousin. His mother's views were never sought, and, holding the surgeon liable for operating, the Appeals Court said: 'Here we have a case of a surgical operation not for the benefit of the person operatedupon, but for another, and one so involved in its techInique as to require a mature mind to understdind precisely what the donor was offering. . . The Court below should . . . have instructed that the consent of the parent was necessary.' Such reasoning implies that, had the mother consented, all would have been well. I believe that under our English law not even a thousand mothers could have regularized the operation. We would surely adopt the view expressed by the United States Supreme Court in another case [12] that: 'Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow that they are free ... to make martyrs of their children. . .'
In the very nature of things, more time is generally available to ascertain the wishes of the donor than those of the donee, whose condition may well render his consent unobtainable. Adequate means of ensuring that the donor's consent was validly obtained are by no means beyond devising. Take Italy, for instance. Article 5 of its 1940 Civil Code forbade the removal of any part of the living human body if its loss permanently impaired physical integrity. But public opinion changed as advances were made in kidney transplantation, and in 1967 a new law was promulgated which permits transplants from living donors, provided (a) that they have given written consent, and (b) that judicial approval of the transplant is first obtained. Under the recent South African Anatomical Donations and Post-Mortem Examinations Bill, two doctors must sanction the removal of tissue from a living person, and that seems a prudent course. But anything in the nature of formal legal procedure is undesirable. I personally favour the suggestion advanced in Canada that the donor's written consent should be given before a magistrate who, while carefully reducing to the minimum all signs of legal technicality, could yet ensure that the donor is a genuine volunteer.
Before we move from the living, consider for a moment the increasingly large number of people who dwell for long periods in a twilight state of life merging almost imperceptibly into death. May tests be conducted on a dying patient without his knowledge or acceptable consent, simply in order to determine the suitability of his organs for transplant purposes after death? Many would regard the very idea as unthinkable had we not been recently alerted by the public complaint of a radiographer that she had been instructed to conduct tests for that very purpose. For my part, I think that the jurist would, if pressed, be forced to say that technically such tests amount to assaults, and that neither the consent of the patient's family nor the ultimate good aimed at would serve to cure the illegality. But I believe that some take the view that, however greatly it may offend susceptibilities, there is nothing illegal in examining terminal patients (even without their consent or that of their relatives) with a view to 'typing' them as potential donors, in the same way as potential donees are already regularly typed. In the light of these conflicting views, I can do no more than diffidently indicate that I regard the former view as the correct one.
Cadavers
Cadavers are, for obvious reasons, the more likely source of transplants. But the available time is extremely limited if irreversible organic damage is to be avoided, and the clinical need to act quickly builds up all sorts of pressures operating powerfully upon the surgeon. Unfortunately, the existing law greatly increases his difficulties. Our Common Law presents a curious paradox. No man has any rights in his body after his death [13] , and his directions as to its disposal can be ignored. In America, on the other hand, the great Justice Cardozo said that: 'Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body' [14] . Here a man's direction that upon his death his body should be used for transplant purposes would protect no one. This distinguished audience is familiar with the steps by which that Common Law rule has been modified by Statutefirstly by the Corneal Grafting Act, 1952, and then far more extensively by the Human Tissue Act, 1961. They borrowed their basic pattern from the Anatomy Act of 1832. That Act dealt, firstly, with the granting of permission for the anatomical examination of a corpse by the person legally in possession of it, and, secondly, with the case where the deceased had 'during the illness whereof he died' directed such anatomical examination. But the Act required that the body be decently interred after dissection and it therefore had nothing to do with the retention of tissue or organs for any purpose. Nevertheless, the grafting of the cornea from the dead to the living had become a frequently performed operation for several years before the 1952 Act for the first time clothed it with legality. There are times when the bold medico makes the cautious lawyer gasp.
Allow me to remind you that Sec.1(1) of the 1961 Act provides that:
'If any person, either in writing at any time or orally in the presence of two or more witnesses during his last illness, has expressed a request that his body or any specified part of his body be used after his death for therapeutic purposes or for purposes of medical education or research, the person lawfully in possession of his body after his death may, unless he has reason to believe that the request was subsequently withdrawn, authorize the removal from the body of any part ... for use in accordance with the request.' It is, perhaps, not always realized that this provision in the Act is paramount and that what immediately follows is expressed to be 'without prejudice' to its effectiveness. The Act naturally goes on to prohibit any such removal 'except by a fully registered medical practitioner who must have satisfied himself by personal examination of the body that life is extinct'. The ascertainment of death is a clinical and not a legal problem and I gladly turn from it, especially when I learn that, in the view of an experienced American surgeon: 'The question of deciding death transcends the problem of transplantation'. All I would say in this context is that modern resuscitative methods demand rethinking about the legal dictionary statement that: 'Death does not occur until the heart stops beating and respiration ends. Death is not a continuous event, but an event that takes place at a precise time' [15] . But however it be defined, proper steps are essential to ensure that the event has indeed occurred before any part is removed. To allay what I feel sure is a real fear that this may not always be so, it is an elementary requirement that the doctor pronouncing the donor's death must always be wholly independent of the transplant team. As one MP succinctly put it in last year's Parliamentary debate on renal transplantation: ' We must not have one doctor in the terrible position of deciding which of two patients should have priority' [16] . Indeed, the Minister of Health announced last year that a Conference chaired by Sir Hector MacLennan had gone further and recommended that: '. . . vital organs should not be removed until spontaneous vital functions had ceased and two doctors, each independent of the transplantation team and one of them being at least 5 years qualified, had certified that this condition was irreversible.' Whatever other modifications in the law may be adopted, I venture to hope that this one will certainly be. And were euthanasia to become legalized, the need for such independence would become even more imperative. Indeed, the call becomes strident when one learns that, according to one eminent surgeon, hopeless respirator cases throughout the world are being subject to organ removal before (as well as after) the respirator has been switched off [17] . The lawyer is not the only person likely to do some hard thinking over the further observation of the same surgeon that: 'The rights of the dying donor have been a cause of anxiety in the past, but, accepting that the donor is a hopeless case, we must now consider the rights of the prospective recipient. ' The time may come when vital organs can be stored until required. But, although one reads of miniature machines to keep a removed heart beating long enough for it to be taken from one hospital to another for transplant surgery, and of plastic hearts for donees, that time is not yet. Until then, the imminence between removal and successful transplant creates great difficulties. Consider what the present law demands, even in the direst emergency. If a person is known to have requested the use of his body for therapeutic purposes, none may gainsay his wishprovided it was expressed in the manner specified by Sec. 1(1) of the 1961 Act. But such cases are rare, and, where no such request is known to have been made, the Act enables 'the person lawfully in possession of the body' to authorize the removal of a part only 'if, having made such reasonable enquiry as may be practicable, he has no reason to believe (a) that the deceased had expressed an objection to his body being so dealt with after his death, and had not withdrawn it; or (b) that the surviving spouse or any surviving relative of the deceased objects to the body being so dealt with.'
To consider how this requirement works, let us take the actual case of Mrs X, the mother of three children, who recently lay waiting at the National Heart Hospital for nearly six months while a transplant team stood by. Eleven times her heart stopped beating, and eleven times she was resuscitated. Relatives and doctors waited hopefully for another heart to become available. But it never did, and she died two months ago. She was not in a general hospital, and accordingly there were no patients who (though otherwise fit) were dying from, for example, motor-crash injuries. And there is understandable reluctance to rush dying donors to the donee's hospital.
But put aside that last complication. Assume that as Mrs X lay in hospital a crash victim was brought in and soon died. What would there be to prevent an immediate heart transplant? A great deal, says the 1961 Act. The victim may well be unknown at the hospital. The odds are even greater against his being known to have requested that his body be used for therapeutic purposes. In those circumstances, may the hospital, as 'the person lawfully in possession of the body' [18], proceed with the transplant? Certainly not. It can do nothing unless and until, 'having made such reasonable enquiry as may be practicable', it has no reason to believe either that the deceased had expressed an objection or that his 'surviving spouse or any survivingrelative' objects.
At present the admirable suggestion that people should carry with them a document indicating their consent is insufficiently ventilated, for I think that the vast majority would accept it. In its absence, what of the surviving spouse and relatives? They may be all entirely unknown. Even if known, they may be far distant and quick communication impossible. Nevertheless, the Statute does nothing to dispense with the necessity for making reasonable efforts to ascertain their views. It does not enable the hospital to say that, if the emergency is so great that time does not permit of any enquiry, none is 'practicable' and therefore none need be attempted. Meanwhile the precious minutes fly all too swiftly past. Furthermore, even if the circumstances are so remarkably propitious that the family are speedily contacted (and leavinig aside the great difficulty of seeking their consent at such a time of shock and sorrow), they still have the power of absolute veto in the absence of any express request by the deceased.
The 1961 Act is quite unsuitable to deal with such cases, and its provisions demand the consideration they are now receiving at the hands of a distinguished group. But, whatever the outcome, there will surely be an outcry. No matter which side wins the day, there will be honourable men in the opposite camp to lament their victory. However desirous of serving humanity they may be, many will on religious or other grounds feel a sense of outrage were a body 'mutilated' (as they would probably describe it), even for the sake of saving lives.
On the other hand, if one accepts (as I do) that the removal of organs for transplant purposes from cadavers ought to be facilitated, what should be done to remove the powerful brakes imposed by the present law? There is no dearth of suggestions. A Member of Parliament has twice unsuccessfully introduced a Renal Transplantation Bill which many think has much to commend it but which deals with only part of the problem. Lord Kilbrandon has made a more drastic recommendation which has received wide attention and surely has great merit. He would amend the 1961 Act by a simple provision that: 'In any designated hospital it shall be lawful to remove from a dead person any organ required for medical or scientific purposes unless the hospital authorities have reason to believe that the deceased in his lifetime had forbidden this to be done, provided that such removal shall not disfigure the dead body'. This is very sweeping. It would dispense with the necessity for making any enquiry as to whether the deceased had expressed any views about transplants, or whether his relatives have any objections. It would also prevent those relatives taking it upon themselves to impose a veto even where the deceased had expressed none.
The only barrier would be if there was 'reason to believe that the deceased' had himself forbidden removals. As to this, the Minister of Health said in Parliament last year that '. . . an effective system should be devised and effectively publicized, under which persons could record objections during life, with certainty that these could be asczrtained and would be respected.'
For my part, I would also like thought given to means whereby people could make known their desire that their bodies should be used for transplant and similar purposes. I say this because I believe that many would wish their dead bodies to be so used. How can their wish be realized? In at least one large American hospital all patients (whether seriously ill or not) are automatically asked on admission whether they are willing to donate organs in the event of their death. But I have some doubt whether such a fixed procedure would find general acceptance, and we must think again. In this context, those interested might care to look at the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1967, prepared in America by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
Should the Human Tissue Act, 1961, be amended at all ? Basically, this is a political question, and the public must soon face up to it. Many of us feel that it should. If that view prevails, Lord Kilbrandon's suggestion may prove the most acceptable. But some may regard it as concentrating excessively upon the needs of the donee and as ignoring the feelings of the deceased's family. It would enable a transplant to be performed even though his surviving relatives were known to be completely opposed, and this may well provoke strong opposition to an otherwise helpful measure. It is therefore worthy of consideration whether a further qualification should be added, to the effect that the operation must not be performed if the hospital authorities have reason to believe that the surviving spouse or near relatives object, confining the latter to parents, children, brothers and sisters. It seems unlikely that such a qualification (which would still impose no duty of enquiry) would substantially limit the usefulness of the proposed measure, and it does have regard to family feelings. It would, in effect, apply the language of Sec. 1 (2) of the Comeal Grafting Act, 1952, to all organs. But I would stress that nothing should be done to diminish the overriding authority which the duly expressed request of the deceased even now possesses under the 1961 Act.
Conclusion
And there I must leave the matter. Believe me, I did not carelessly choose the title of these discursive and inadequate remarks. A 'look' is a casual affair and by selecting that word I wanted to emphasize that I was undertaking to decide nothing. Indeed it would have been impertinent had I attempted anything of the kind. In the short time available I have simply sought to underline some of the legal issues involved in a complex of great significance to people of many disciplines. In places I have inevitably trodden ground familiar to many of you. My only aim has been to stimulate thought and discussion, for the public interest in organ transplants demands and deserves deep thought and considerable discussion.
In the words of none other than the Professor of Civil Law at Oxford, Dr Daube [9] , at the splendid CIBA Symposium of 1966 (chaired by Lord Kilbrandon) to which I am greatly indebted:
'Progress in transplantation is a matter for wonder and dread; and no tribute to the courage and humanity of the pioneers can be too high. The jurists certainly must adapt their rigid, over-conceptualized thinking to the novel conditions; and the doctors in their turn should perhaps acknowledge in increasing measure their accountability outside their closed circle of peers before a wider forum of society, ethics and law. . . we are becoming more and more answerable to a wider and wider public. If we take care to preserve the principal traditional values in the process, we may yet achieve a civilized result.' Dr David Kerr MP: I would like first to record my gratitude to Lord Justice Edmund Davies for his impressive and authoritative review of so much of the legal aspect of transplant. I would, with great humility, suggest to him that there is a third category of donor, and it is this category which gives pause to so many of us at this moment.
Lord Justice Edmund Davies referred to the cadaver and to the living, but the third category about which I want briefly to speak is the category which involves the inevitable death of the donor: that is to say, the donor who provides the heart or liver and, perhaps one day in the very remote future, the brain to a donee. It seems to me that it is this category of donor which is raising in so many people's minds the very difficulties whichare not yet being effectively tackled by the law and which Sir Hector MacLennan's Committee is more particularly concerned about than with any other. I think it should be much more widely known that the removal of a heart from a donor can really be effective only when that heart is capable ofresuscitation and either continues beating or can be immediately restored to beatingthat is, when the heart would never, in the particular case of the donor, be able to offer the criteria of life or death. It is precisely because it is a living organ and continues to be one that it is of any use at all in a transplant operation.
Because we are doing this, because we are now on the threshold, or even a little over it, of determining the moment of death instead of determining the fact of death, which is what we have always done hitherto, this imposes on all of usnot merely distinguished judges and doctors, not just Members of Parliament, but the whole range of public opinionthe need to examine constantly and closely its attitudes towards this determination.
Lord Justice Edmund Davies said that in no circumstances should minors be allowed to become donors, and neither should prisoners.
In the context of today's transplant potentials, I would think that there are very good grounds to extend that list very widely and to begin with all people who are currently being kept alive in iron lungs, people detained in mental hospitals under the Mental Health Act and all children who are institutionalized for any form of physical or mental handicapin fact, to extend the protection of the law to all those whose permission would never be valid but which might fall under an umbrella such as that offered by Lord Kilbrandon's dictum.
One last word about coroners. I am a member of the Home Office Committee which is currently considering death certification and the work of coroners. Although I am not at liberty to convey any findings, even supposing such existed, I would like to assure the audience that this question has come before the Committee and has been very carefully examined.
The present period is, I think, showing hopeful developments; apparently, all those engaged in transplant have gone to considerable trouble to engage the sympathy and understanding of the local coroners who are involved in this and to make sure that the coroner is told beforehand about any projected operation. This seems to me to be an entirely practical and desirable way to proceed at the moment.
The difficulty which will be apparent, as it was, indeed, to the Committee, was the power which this gives to a coroner to intervene, not necessarily to the benefit of either the donor or the donee, and on the basis of criteria which have not been clearly laid down. In other words, this is one more plea to clear our minds not only of the legal consequences of the problems of transplant, but of some of the ethical ones as they apply to the community as a whole and to all of us as individuals.
Lord Justice Edmund Davies: Dr David Kerr has, not surprisingly, put his finger on one of the biggest problems that I have come across in my reading for the paper. It is an intensely difficult matter. Somehow, a legal definition of death must be devised which is clinically acceptable. How it is to be defined I simply do not know. But the utmost care must obviously be taken in arriving at it, because whatever the conclusion, it is bound to give rise to the gravest perturbation in many minds.
The very idea that a person who, in the layman's sense of the word, is to be regarded as still in the land of the living is to be deprived of a vital organ, no matter for whatever beneficent purpose, is outrageous to most people. It is a very great problem. I do not know the answer. I wish I did. Certainly, minds far better than mine have a great task before them in attempting it.
Professor Roy Calne (Cambridge): I should like to raise several points which have relevance to what has been said. The first concerns the need for organs. I shall confine my remarks entirely to organs of dead people. At present, about 2,000-3,000 young people die from kidney disease every year in England and Wales and only about 100 of these are offered treatment, and yet we know that 50-60 % of these patients could be alive at between one and two years after transplantation, restored from a moribund condition to a healthy and happy state of life. The public needs to consider with rather more charity than it has done in the past the plight of people who are getting no treatment at all.
There is no biological reason why other organs will not be transplanted eventually just as successfully as kidneys. It is inevitableand it must be acceptedthat this is a branch of surgery which has arrived, and it will become standard practice in the near future.
Bearing this in mind, what do the public, and the profession in particular, feel about a corpse? I would agree entirely with the suggestion of Lord Justice Edmund Davies, based upon that of Lord Kilbrandon, that there should be provision for contracting out. Provision for contracting out could easily be provided in terms of a computer and the carrying of a cardparticularly a centralized computer, which could be contacted at any time of the day or night. People who feel strongly against transplantation would be filling in their postcards within minutes of the offer being made. I think that the majority of the population, and particularly the lay public, feel that to try to do good with ones organs after death is better than having them burned or eaten by worms.
The public and the profession need reassurance, however, on three things: first, that the possibility that organs will be taken from them after death will not hamper the way in which the doctors treat their relatives or themselves and that there will be no deterioration of care for the dying person. I can assure you that in this country, when the question is raised of removing organs after death of a person who is gravely ill, the immediate reaction of those, both nursing and medical, looking after such a person is the reverse of lowering their standards of care. They redouble them.
The question of whether a person is dead is something to which I would like to return presently, but I wish to say a few words on publicity. The fear of having one's name on being bereaved, one's pictures or, even worse, pictures of the dead person on television screens and newspapers all over the country, perhaps even all over the world, is a serious deterrent to people wanting to donate their organs for this charitable purpose. The argument that this publicity is in the public interest is cynical and hypocritical. Thus, the care of a person who is dying and the fear of publicity are two important factors.
The question of death has been touched upon by all speakers so far and I would like to add a few comments. There is a great deal of confusion between two things: (a) at what stage one diagnoses that somebody is dead, and (b) what is one's attitude to resuscitation. I maintain that these are not connected; they are quite separate. With regard to resuscitation, if somebody dies suddenly, unexpectedly, perhaps from a stroke, coronary thrombosis or an accident, it is the duty of any doctor to attempt resuscitation and to continue resuscitation until he is satisfied that further attempts at resuscitation can benefit his patient not at all and will only cause further distress to the relatives. To continue resuscitation in such circumstances is bad medicine, and I am sure that there are few people present who would feel that one should try to continue resuscitation under the circumstances I have mentioned.
But how does the doctor determine that resuscitation should not be continued any further? The answer is usually very simple: when he has satisfied himself that the brain is irreversibly dead.
Having made the decision to stop resuscitation, then to inform the transplantation team that he has made his decision and that there may be the possibility of using organs from such a person would seem to me to be part of the same charity towards people who need transplants that I mentioned before.
But the decision to make the cessation of resuscitation has nothing to do with transplantation. This was a decision which was made before transplantation was thought about. Neurosurgeons or neurologists will tell you that stopping artificial means of support, ventilation or cardiac massage, is something that is practised quite totally distinct from any considerations of transplantation, and I think that this should continue. The only connexion with transplantation is that, when the decision has been made, information is given to the transplantation surgeon to make it possible to perform a successful operation. Now, a word about the definition of death and the question of brain death. If a body is guillotined and you can see the head separated from the rest of the body, I think that very few people would regard the individual as alive, and yet his organs would be alive for several minutes. His brain would die within the course of two or three minutes. His heart might go on beating longer. If hmemorrhage was curtailed and artificial respiration on the lower part of the guillotined body was continued, the organs could be kept alive perhaps hours or days and yet still I do not believe that anybody would consider that person to be alive; and to remove organs if the person had willed it would be perfectly reasonable and just.
To determine brain death in an intact individual is an altogether different exercise and much more difficult. I maintain that it is unnecessary in the pursuit of transplantation. It is unnecessary to remove a beating heart for successful transplantation.
The liver is more sensitive than the heart to anoxic damage, yet it is possible to remove the liver after traditional death has been diagnosed, after cessation of heartbeat and respiration, after attempts at resuscitation have been stopped for the reasons I have already mentioned. This rather rigid and traditional code of diagnosing death would seem to be acceptable to everybody since it has been practised for 2,000 years. With this definition of death, I see no reason why the law should not be changed on the lines mentioned. In fact, failure to change the law will hold up progress in transplantation to a very serious degree and will result in the tragic deaths of patients awaiting transplantation who could otherwise be treated.
Lord Justice Edmund Davies: I am grateful to Professor Roy Calne for his observations. One part of what he said underlined what I feel sure, and tried to say in my paper, is a very real fear in the public, and, somehow or other, they have to be won over on the point.
He observed that the resuscitative team continue their efforts until all hope must be abandoned. That goes without saying. But resuscitative methods were in existence and employed long before transplant was attempted. Nevertheless, transplant has complicated the position.
I am quite sure that, even if I do not speak for the vast majority of people in this countryand who am I to claim anything of the sort?nevertheless I am speaking for a very large number of people who entertain the fear that, unless there is complete segregation of the team dealing with the dying person and the patient, on the one hand, and the transplant team awaiting a donated organ, on the other hand, public opinion and support of the procedure will never be won over. There is a very real, primitive fear which many of us entertain of that sort of thing happening.
1 cannot help about the definition of death. As I said before, it is with the help of the clinicians that a legal definition must be formulated which, in turn, both they and the public are prepared to act upon. I have already said that the task seems to me to be formidable, and I can only congratulate myself on the fact that I am not charged with its solution.
